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THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE LAW
IN WISCONSIN
C. J. OTJEN
F OR nineteen years Wisconsin has made provision for occupational
disease in its Workmen's Compensation Act. With the present
general interest in occupational disease, a review of the legal history of
Wisconsin's law indemnifying therefor should be of value.
This state has had a workmen's compensation act since 1911. The
law was based upon the theory that compensation for industrial acci-
dents should be a part of the cost of production. The law necessarily
provided as one of the conditions of liability that the relationship of
employer and employee must exist. Coupled with this provision was
the requirement that the accident must arise out of and in the course
of the employment. The law was originally drafted with the thought
of traumatic injuries in mind. The various provisions, such as notice
of injury and date of liability, were all predicated upon this thought.
Wisconsin has been consistently liberal in its interpretation of the
compensation act. Claims have arisen based upon a condition in the
nature of a disease, but not truly occupational, for which compensation
has been allowed. As early as 1915 the supreme court approved an
award for compensation for typhoid fever contracted from drinking
contaminated water furnished by the employer.' Compensation for
I Vennen, Adm. v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N.W. 640 (1915) ;
Ellingson Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 168 Wis. 227, 169 N.W. 568
(1918).
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smallpox was approved where the employee while doing repair work
in an isolation hospital had been exposed to disease.' In these cases
the court did not proceed on the theory of an occupational disease, but
justified the award upon the finding that the employment had peculiarly
increased the hazard of exposure. The rule followed was to grant com-
pensation only for injuries resulting from a hazard peculiar to the
industry or substantially increased by reason of the nature of the
services which the employee was required to perform.
In 1919 the act was amended to provide for occupational disease.
At the time of this proposal there was some apprehension on the part
of the employers and insurers as to the consequence of such a provi-
sion. The question of occupational disease had not then attracted the
general interest of the public as has been experienced in more recent
years. Comparatively little publicity was given to the amendment. A
general revision of the compensation act was not considered, possibly
due to failure to anticipate the many questions to follow later, or
possibly in order not to create undue apprehension and opposition to
the measure. The amendment therefore was accomplished by adding
a new section at the end of the then existing law as follows: "The pro-
visions of sections 2394-1 to 2394-31 both inclusive, are extended so as
to include, in addition to accidental injuries, all other injuries includ-
ing occupational diseases, growing out of and incidental to the employ-
ment."
13
We should note from the amendment quoted "occupational disease"
was not more specifically defined, leaving the question as to just what
constituted "occupational disease" open to interpretation as the cases
arose. The first case to reach the supreme court under this amendment
was that of Belle City Malleable Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission.4
This was a claim for occupational hernia. Th'e claim was dismissed
upon the ground that there had been a failure of proof that the employ-
ment had produced the condition. However, the case did recognize the
possibility of hernia as an occupational disease under proper showing.
The second case was that of Wenrich v. Industrial Commission,
which recognized that in the stone cutting industry "the conse-
quent filling of the lungs with granite dust necessarily makes one so
employed much more, and particularly, susceptible to pulmonary tuber-
culosis." The development of tuberculosis under such circumstances
was then held to come under the provisions of the occupational disease
amendment.
2 Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 192 Wis. 362, 212 N.W. 641 (1927).
* Wis. Stat. (1919) § 2394-32.
* 180 Wis. 344, 192 N.W. 1010 (1923).
5182 Wis. 379, 196 N.W. 824 (1924).
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The question of the constitutionality of the occupational disease
provision was not raised until 1924. In Schaefer & Company v. Indus-
trial Commission,, the court held the act to be constitutional with the
following statement: "This court has many times sustained action of
the railroad commission as constitutional under conditions trenching
much closer on judicial power than the action of the Industrial Com-
mission in the instant case. As was said in Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147
Wis. 327, 358, 133 N.W. 209, the Industrial Commission 'is an admin-
istrative body or arm of the government which in the course of its
administration of a law is empowered to ascertain some questions of
fact and apply the existing law thereto, and in so doing acts quasi-
judicially, but it is not thereby vested with judicial power in the con-
stitutional sense.' We hold the act in question within the constitutional
province of the legislature."
The fact that occupational disease develops over a period of time
in contrast to a traumatic injury was not presented to the supreme
court until 1924.7 This case presented a situation where the employee
was suffering from tuberculosis superimposed upon silicosis. He had
been employed part time by three separate granite concerns over a
period of years, during which time the condition of silicosis arose. The
commission found that he became disabled as of December 8, 1922,
due to his tuberculosis, at which time he was actually in the employ
of one of the three employers. On the theory that the condition had
arisen over a period of time, the commission prorated the compensa-
tion due between the three employers. The supreme court proceeded
upon the theory that the provisions of the law had been drafted pri-
marily with the thought of traumatic injuries in mind and established
liability on the basis of a specific date, which was the date disability
commenced. The court announced the rule that liability attached as
of the date of disability and that the employer in whose service the
employee was at that time was liable for the entire compensation.
This question as to date of liability was again carefully considered
by the court in 1928 in the case of Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v.
McCormick.8 The question arose due to change of insurance carriers
during the period of the development of the disease, the last insurer
taking the position that due to the short period of its coverage there
was no liability on its part because the period of time was too short to
cause or materially contribute to the condition. The court, commenting
upon the various provisions of the act with reference to notice,
observed: "Unless the date when the employee is disabled from rend-
185 Wis. 317, 201 N.W. 396 (1924).
-Schaefer & Company v. Industrial Commission, 185 Wis. 317, 201 N.W. 396
(1924).
6 195 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 738 (1928).
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ering further service be taken as the date that determines liability, it
will be very difficult to administer the workmen's compensation act so
far as disability resulting from occupational disease is concerned. The
protection of the rights of both the employer and the employee requires
that liability be fixed as of that date. If liability must be determined
as of the date when the disease had its inception, the employee would
be under the necessity of giving notice of every slight ailment which
might be the incipient stage of some occupational disease that might
cause disability at some more or less distant future time, and the
employer would be put to the needless expense of investigating all such
notices of claims." In this connection the court observed further with
reference to insurance liability: "The company that had insured the
compensation liability at the time disability occurred is the one that
must pay the compensation awarded. This rule will work no injustice
to any individual carrier or employer because the law of averages will
equalize burdens imposed by this act among the employers and the
compensation insurers of the state."
The rule that the insurance carrier on the risk, irrespective of
length of coverage, at the date of disability, was liable for the com-
pensation due, was consistently followed thereafter.9 The same rule
that liability attached as of the date of disability was again followed
in a case where the employer had withdrawn from the provisions of
the workmen's compensation act prior to the date of disability and
compensation was denied30°
In 1930 another occupational disease was definitely recognized in
the case of Hayes v. Industrial Commission,12 when the court held that
under a proper showing lead poisoning was an occupational disease
under the act. The rule that liability attaches when disability occurs
underwent further refinement and clarification. The situation arose
where an employee had contracted an occupational disease but at the
time of disability was working for a new employer whose employment
had not caused or contributed to the condition.12 The court held that
the employment at the time of disability must have caused or con-
tributed to the condition, commenting as follows: "There must be
some causal relationship between the accident or the disease and the
work of the employment. There is no rule of law which attempts to
9 Falk Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 202 Wis. 284, 232 N.W. 542 (1930);
Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 135,
233 N.W. 722 (1930); Outboard Motor Co. v. Industrial Commission, 206 Wis.
131, 239 N.W. 141 (1931); Jackson Monument Co. v. Industrial Commission,
220 Wis. 390, 265 N.W. 63 (1936).
10 Montello Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 197 Wis. 428, 222 N.W. 315
(1928).
11202 Wis. 218, 231 N.W. 584 (1930).
3 Hayes v. Industrial Commission, 202 Wis. 218, 231 N.W. 584 (1930).
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shift this burden to a subsequent employer who has in no way caused
or contributed to the disability, accident, or disease."
The next qualification arose from a case of temporary or partial
disability followed by further exposure. This was the case of Falk
Corporation v. Industrial Commission'3 in which the court held that the
subsequent disability following further contributing exposure estab-
lished a new date of disability and likewise a new liability. This same
question received extensive reconsideration in 1930 in Zurich etc. In-
surance Co. v. Industrial Commission.'4 In this case the applicant
became ill in 1920. He resumed his employment in 1921. In 1922 the
applicant had another period of disability continuing for about five
months. He was advised at this time that his employment inside and
exposed to dust was detrimental to his health. At his request his em-
ployer transferred him to outdoor work, in which he continued until
October, 1927. At that time he became totally and permanently dis-
abled as a result of tuberculosis superimposed upon silicosis. At the
time of his transfer in 1922 from inside to outside work he experienced
a wage loss. The court gave careful consideration to all of the prior
decisions and came to the conclusion that a distinction had to be drawn
between recurrence of the same condition and a new onset of that
condition due to subsequent exposure, and stated the rule as follows:
" * * * it is considered that it should be held that the 'time of accident'
within the meaning of the statute in occupational disease cases should
be the time when disability first occurs; that the employer in whose
employment the injured workman is and the insurance carrier at that
time are liable for the total consequences due thereto. So that if the
end result, whatever it may be, is inevitably due to exposure already
complete, that employer and that carrier become liable accordingly. If
the disability is partial and there is a recovery and a subsequent dis-
ability with subsequent exposure, then it will be necessary for the com-
mission to determine whether the subsequent disability arose from a
recurrence or is due to a new onset induced by a subsequent exposure.
If it finds that the disability is due to a new onset, the employer and
the carrier on the risk at the time the total disability manifests itself
shall be liable accordingly. If, however, there is no subsequent expos-
ure which contributes to the disability and the disability is a recurrence
of the former occupational disease, then the employer in whose em-
ployment the employee is when the recurrence takes place is not liable
and so the insurance carrier upon the risk at that time is not liable
on that account."
In this case the court recognized that the rule as announced left
unprovided for the workman who had been subjected to exposure
13 202 Wis. 284, 232 N.W. 542 (1930).
14 203 Wis. 135, 233 N.W. 772 (1930).
1938]
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which did not manifest itself while he was in the employ of an em-
ployer who contributed to his disability, and explained this apparent
inequity by the statement: "The statute is not aimed at exposure but
disability. An accident which produces no disability is not compen-
sable." The court, with consideration for the provisions as to notice
and limitation of action, also expressed the opinion that as the statute
was worded, to hold that the last exposure should be taken as the "time
of accident" would involve the whole matter in great difficulty and
uncertainty.
A reasonable number of cases involving the last stated rule were
carried to the supreme court, but involved primarily the question as
to whether or not the evidence sustained the findings of the commis-
sion as to the date disability first occurred from which the end result
was inevitable due to exposure already complete.'5 A similar question
was raised by the last employers whose period of employment had been
comparatively short taking the position that they had not caused the
condition and therefore should not be held liable. The court f6llowed
the rule that irrespective of the length of the last employment, if that
employment had contributed to the condition followed by disability,
the employer at the time of disability was liable. In passing it might be
worthy of note that the commission held a period of employment from
March 10th to May 15th sufficient to contribute to the condition and
create liability, and were sustained on the theory that it was a question
of fact to be determined by the commission.", In another case the man
had been discharged from a sanitarium as an arrested case of tuber-
culosis. He was employed for a period of three months, following
which occurred a new breakdown. The commission was sustained in
holding liability upon the last employer.17
In 1931, for the purpose of making the act more certain and to
eliminate as far as possible the numerous questions of fact as to the
date disability first occurred from which the end result was inevitable
due to exposure already complete, the following amendment was
adopted: "* * * 'Time of injury,' 'occurrence of injury,' 'date of in-
jury' is the date of the accident which caused the injury or the date
when the disability from the occupational disease first occurs. ' 18
Though the actual wording of the amendment appeared clear and
in conformity with the Zurich Insurance Company case, it will be noted
15Outboard Motor Co. v. Industrial Commission, 206 Wis. 131, 239 N.W. 141
(1931); Marquette Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 207 Wis. 151, 240
N.W. 793 (1932); Kannenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis.
651, 250 N.W. 821 (1933); Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 210
Wis. 398, 245 N.W. 680 (1933).
6 Kannenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 651, 250 N.W.
821 (1933).
IT Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 210 Wis. 398, 245 N.W. 680(1933).is Wis. Laws (1931) c. 403 § 2.
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that the amendment did not carry the words of the court "from which
the end result is inevitable due to exposure already complete." A
review of the cases will show, however, that the amendment was so
interpreted.
In 1930 the effect of the depression was beginning to be felt. With
it came slack employment, staggered employment, and a rather general
termination of employment. This condition was the cause of a very
substantial increase in claims, both of traumatic origin as well as of
occupational disease. A series of cases raising various questions of
liability promptly followed. The next few years many more cases in-
volving the act reached the supreme court than in any similar period
of time prior. In 1933 the case of Kimlark Rug Corp. v. Industrial
Comnission,19 was decided by the court. This was a claim of occupa-
tional dermatitis. Though the employee did actually experience dis-
comfort during his employment, it had not progressed to a condition
of disability until subsequent to the termination of the employer-
employee relationship. This case is noteworthy because of a definite
statement of the rule that the relationship of employer and employee
must exist at the date of disability. The rule followed the provision
that as one of the conditions of liability this relationship must exist.
As hereinbefore pointed out, the provision goes to the fundamental
theory of the law that industrial accidents should be charged to the cost
of production. This rule has been consistently followed.F0
At this point it is well to observe that in the Kimlark Rug Corpora-
tion case the claim was based upon a condition of alleged occupational
dermatitis. The case, however, raised no question as to whether or not
this particular dermatitis was an occupational disease. Apparently it
was assumed to be covered by the act. In this connection a reasonable
number of claims involving such conditions as hemlock poisoning,
dermatitis due to susceptibility to cement and other substances, have
been presented to the commission. The duration of the disability and
the compensation involved have to date not justified presenting the
question squarely to the court as to whether or not an individual sus-
ceptibility without increased exposure can be justified under the occu-
pational disease provisions of the law. When the condition is due to an
individual peculiar susceptibility, in the opinion of the writer it does
not constitute an occupational disease and should not be recognized.
19210 Wis. 319, 246 N.W. 424 (1933).
2 0 Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 211 Wis. 52, 247 N.W.
343 (1933); North End Foundry Co. Cases, 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439(1935) ; Kannenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 651, 250
N.W. 821 (1933); Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 210 Wis. 398,
245 N.W. 680 (1933); Montreal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 225 Wis.
1, 272 N.W. 828 (1937).
1938]
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The rule of law that the relationship of employer and employee
must exist at the time of disability to create liability brought forth a
number of cases involving the question as to just what terminated this
relationship. The court recognized or established the presumption that
the relationship continued in the absence of a definite showing of its
termination. A temporary lay-off for repairs or a temporary shut-down
of the plant was held not to be sufficient to terminate the relationship.2 1
The distinctions were drawn closely and another troublesome situa-
tion arose over the question of the meaning of "disability." Many men
made claim even though experiencing only an early state of uncompli-
cated silicosis. After considerable study the Wisconsin commission
recognized the general medical opinion that uncomplicated first stage
and early second stage silicosis were not disabling. Silicosis in any
stage complicated by tuberculosis was definitely recognized as disabling,
and later second stage and third stage silicosis was a question of fact
as to degree of disability with the doubts resolved in favor of the
employee.
Due to the rule that disability must occur prior to discharge to
create liability, many theories were advanced to overcome the rule.
Slack and staggered employment together with customary short periods
of illness of people generally gave a golden opportunity for applicants
to claim prior disability and under circumstances where it was hard to
disprove. Silicosis develops slowly, and it was comparatively easy to
date medical opinion back to a lapse in the payroll. Applicants' attor-
neys were also advancing the theory that though the payroll records
showed no time loss when work was available, had it not been for
staggered employment the employee would have had to quit at some
prior time and in fact there existed a partial permanent disability prior
to the discharge. These claims were backed up by medical opinion that
the man could not have continued under steady work.22
A distinction was also drawn between medical disability and physi-
cal disability. Medical disability was defined as a case where the em-
ployee had not discontinued work but his condition was such that a
medical adviser or examiner would have advised him so to do. Physical
disability was understood to mean actual physical inability to carry on.
The industrial commission at first were allowing compensation upon
these various theories, most probably because of the harshness of the
rule that disability must occur prior to the discharge. The supreme
21 Wisconsin Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 208 Wis. 270, 242 N.W. 191
(1932); Michigan Quartz Silica Co. v. Syring, 214 Wis. 289, 252 N.W. 682(1934); Kannenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 651, 250
N.W. 821 (1933).
22Chain Belt Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 116, 264 N.W. 502 (1936);
Sivyer Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 252, 263 N.W.
565 (1936).
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court, however, refused to recognize so-called "medical disability" in
absence of an actual wage loss when there was work available to do.2 3
The court did recognize that upon a definite showing of reduced wage
due to change of employment made necessary because of silicosis,
created a compensable partial disability.2 The rule was finally estab-
lished that "disability" under the act as then worded meant "wage
loss."
The court, in the North End Foundry Company Cases,26 com-
mented as follows: "The rule was adopted for the reason that the
fundamental idea of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to award
compensation for a wage loss suffered either by disability, total or
partial, permanent or temporary." The right of an employer to dis-
charge an employee in anticipation of disability and thereby avoid
liability, was questioned. The court, however, held that medical exami-
nations could be justified upon a humanitarian basis as well as liability
and that the employer had this right.2
A careful review of all of the decisions was made in the North
End Foundry Company Cases.25 This was a series of cases, all argued
before the court at the same time. Some of the claimants were actually
suffering from tuberculosis superimposed upon silicosis. They had been
medically examined at the instance of the employer and thereafter
definitely discharged prior to actually having sustained any wage or
time loss. The court held to the rule that the relationship of employer
and employee must exist at the time of disability, that medical dis-
ability was not such disability as contemplated by the act, that compen-
sation disability meant wage loss, and dismissed the claims.
In 1933 the act was amended for the purpose of providing for the
cases where disability arose subsequent to discharge. The following
amendment was adopted: "Section 102.01 (2) * * * 'Time of injury,'
'occurrence of injury,' 'date of injury' is the date of the accident which
caused the injury or in the case of disease, the last day of work for
the last employer whose employment caused disability." '
23 Schaefer & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 289, 265 N.W. 390 (1936);
North End Foundry Co. Cases, 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439 (1935).
2 Glancy Malleable Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission,- 216 Wis. 615, 258 N.W.
445 (1935).25 Kimlark Rug Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 210 Wis. 319, 246 N.W. 424
(1933); Michigan Quartz Silica Co. v. Industrial Commission, 214 Wis. 492,
253 N.W. 167 (1934); Kannenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212
Wis. 651, 250 N.W. 821 (1933); North End Foundry Co. Cases, 217 Wis. 363,
258 N.W. 439 (1935); Chain Belt Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 116,
264 N.W. 502 (1936) ; Sivyer Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220
Wis. 252, 263 N.W. 565 (1936).
26 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439 (1935).
27 Motor Castings Co. v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 204, 262 N.W. 577
(1935).
28217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439 (1935).
29 Wis. Laws (1933) c. 314 § 2, c. 402 § 2.
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The question as to the definition of "disability" again arose, and the
court held that the amendment had not changed the definition as estab-
lished by court decisions. The effect of the decision was that actual
disability-wage loss-had to be shown even under the amendment
before liability arose.-" The theory was advanced that under the 1933
amendment former disability was immaterial and that liability attached
as of the last day of employment by the last employer who contributed
to the condition. The court held, however, that this was not the mean-
ing of the amendment, explaining: "That statute applied only when a
wage loss occurs after the relation of employer and employee is termi-
nated. * * * The law of 1933 was intended to supplement and not to
supplant the holding in Zurich Gen. Acc. & L. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 203 Wis. 135, 233 N.W. 772 (1930), and other cases in
which the defect in the law was pointed out," so that if wage loss due
to silicosis had occurred prior to discharge, the date of such disability
fixed the date of liability notwithstanding the 1933 amendment.3
In connection with the 1933 amendment creating liability for subse-
quent disability at the last day of employment which contributed to the
condition, there was a danger of applications being prematurely made.
A dismissal on the basis that no actual disability existed, though the
applicant actually had some degree of silicosis, might have defeated a
legitimate claim at a later date. In order to protect against this possi-
bility and to discourage the bringing of non-meritorious or premature
claims, the 1935 legislature enacted the following provision: "Section
102.18-FINDINGS AND AWARD. (1) * * * Where there is a find-
ing that the employe is in fact suffering from an occupational disease
caused by the employment of the employer against whom the applica-
tion is filed, a final award dismissing such application upon the ground
that the applicant has suffered no disability from said disease shall
not bar any claim he may thereafter have for disability sustained after
the date of said award. ' '3
It had been discovered that many men with an early stage of sili-
cosis not actually disabling had brought claim because of their inability
to obtain further foundry employment. Their inability to obtain further
employment was due either to a fear of future liability or because of
the fact that in medical opinion further exposure in time would pro-
duce disability. With the thought in mind of correcting this inequity
or injustice, a further amendment was adopted in 1935. The theory of
SO Schaefer & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 289, 265 N.W. 390 (1936) ;
Milwaukee Malleable & Grey Iron Works v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis.
244, 265 N.W. 394 (1936).
- General Acc. Fire & Life As. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 221 Wis. 540,
266 N.W. 224 (1936); General Acc. Fire & Life As. Corp. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 221 Wis. 544, 266 N.W. 226 (1936).
32Wis. Laws (1935) c. 465 § 2.
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the amendment was to provide a reasonable sum in the nature of a
rehabilitation award so that a man could readjust himself during the
period of learning a new trade. The provision was as follows:
"Section 102.565-NONDISABLING SILICOSIS. (1) When the
conditions of liability as provided in this chapter exist, except as pro-
vided in this section, and an employe is discharged from employment
because he has a nondisabling silicosis under circumstances such as to
occasion wage loss, the commission may allow such sum for compensa-
tion on account thereof, as it may deem just, not exceeding seventy per
cent of his average annual earnings as defined in section 102.11.
"(2) Payment of a benefit under this section to an employe shall
estop such employe from any further recovery under this section." 33
Section 102.565 was further amended by the 1937 legislature to
cover the situation where, after medical examination, it is determined
that the employe should not continue to expose himself further to silica
dust though presently not actually disabled therefrom. The amendment
increased, in the discretion of the industrial commission, the amount
allowable for nondisabling silicosis to a maximum of thirty-five hun-
dred dollars. Neither of these last two amendments has as yet been
considered by the supreme court.
A clarification of the meaning of occupational disease was had in
the recent case of Schmitt v. Industrial Commission.- In that case the
court followed the definition of occupational disease: "If the occupa-
tion be one which naturally gives rise to a disease, then the disease
acquired by reason of the occupation followed may properly be said
to be an occupational disease, even though it might result from more
than one occupation."3 5 The court, however, points out clearly the fol-
lowing distinction: "Unless, however, the disability be shown to have
resulted from an occupational disease, its cause must be found in an
accident in order to warrant the award of compensation, and a mere
breakdown due to disease is not compensable, even if the physical
effort involved in the work made some contribution to the final disa-
bility. '
3
A general review of the history of the occupational disease deci-
sions gives rise to certain definite conclusions. Though there was some
apprehension on the part of comparatively few people at the time of
the first adoption of the law, the actual number of claims and the
attending cost were comparatively small prior to 1930. Due to general
apathy or ignorance on the subject, occupational disease had received
little consideration prior to the depression. The great increase of
nWis. Laws (1935) c. 465 §3.
34224 Wis. 531, 272 N.W. 486 (1937).
-
5 Marathon P. M. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 17, 233 N.W. 558
(1930).
36Employers Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 669, 250
N.W. 758 (1933).
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claims, brought about by slack employment and discontinuance of
employment, crystallized thought upon this subject. In the large group
of claims which followed, many non-meritorious claims were brought.
Many cases of non-disabling early stage silicosis were presented to the
commission for decision. The actual cost in Wisconsin would have
been far greater than it was had it not been for the technical legal
defenses made possible by the then existing law. Possibly the experi-
ence was costly enough, and it did create an occupational disease con-
sciousness. This resulted in substantial effort to control the hazards.
Plant sanitation and medical check-ups came into existence. The sub-
stantial decrease of occupational disease claims, even preceding the
recent re-employment movement, indicates clearly that much has been
done to bring the situation under control.
The pile-up of occupational disease claims as a result of the depres-
sion did much to give the industries a house-cleaning and a new start.
As pointed out, the Compensation Act has been amended to afford
protection in the insidious occupational diseases, so that a halt can be
called before real damage has been done, and the worker be com-
pensated for the loss of his trade. This method is not only humani-
tarian, but will substantially control losses from this source. The gen-
eral prejudice and fear against provision for occupational disease in
workmen's compensation acts, in the opinion of the writer, is rather
unfounded. It is far better to have the compensation established on
some fair, equitable and definite basis, and the cases tried by an experi-
enced judiciary, as is the case under the workmen's compensation act,
than to hazard the allowance of damages by a jury of well-meaning,
sympathetic, but inexperienced men.
